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There is pressure to increase female representation on corporate boards. A number
of studies have found no, or in some cases a negative, e¤ect of female representation
on boards and rm performance. We demonstrate robust positive and economically
meaningful e¤ects on rm performance of female representation on European boards.
Moreover, while previous work has considered female representation broadly, we fo-
cus on membership of committees involved explicitly in rm governance. We demon-
strate marked, larger, e¤ects on performance of having female representation on these
committees. Finally, we reconcile this evidence with prior US and UK evidence and
demonstrate a positive performance impact of female committee memberships. Our
evidence is supportive of the expansion of female involvement in corporate governance
from a nancial performance perspective.
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Board gender diversity has become a salient issue for rms and policy makers. In part this
reects basic principles of social equity. While the share of female employment in large
rms has increased dramatically, this has not been reected in the gender composition of
executive boards. In addition, proposals to increase the number of female directors are
premised upon the idea that this will be benecial for governance, and ultimately, rm
performance. Together, these views have been at the heart of a number of reforms aimed at
increasing female representation on executive boards. These range from the requirements in
the United States, as well as in the European Union (EU), for rm disclosure of their gender
diversity policy in board recruitment, through to enforced gender quotas in Norway. Gender
diversity has also become an important criterion for institutional investment and listings by
such socially responsible indices as the FTSE4Good Index and the Domini 400 Social Index.
Despite this increased focus, there is little evidence on the performance-impact of female
representation on corporate boards. The evidence that exists for the US and the UK is not
supportive of a positive e¤ect of female board representation. For instance, using a sample
of US rms, Adams and Ferreira (2009) in fact nd a negative impact of having females
on the board on rm performance, despite better attendance records and more e¤ective
monitoring in rms with more gender-balanced boards. While for the UK, Gregory-Smith,
Main and OReilly (2014) nd no evidence that the gender composition of the board a¤ects
rm performance.
One issue is that the focus on representation may miss the actual issue of female in-
tegration into rm governance.. While regulatory and institutional pressures can lead to
appointments of female directors on the board, they do not ensure the participation of ap-
pointed female directors in the governance mechanism. For any director to add value, they
need to be appointed to positions in which they can inuence governance, and consequently
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rm performance. Moreover, the economic implications of board gender diversity may be
ambiguous if decisions to increase female representation on boards are, in part, driven by
social and political pressures, i.e. token representation. In this sense, female directors can
add value if and only if there are enabling mechanisms within the board to facilitate that.
We return to this issue examining data from large European rms. This setting is ad-
vantageous due to the historically higher gender board representation in many European
countries when compared to the US and the UK. The majority of studies on the impact
on rm performance of gender-diverse boards are based on samples of rms with female
representation is limited to at most a couple of individuals. This is an important point as
estimates derived from these settings e¤ectively provide the e¤ect of appointing the rst
female director (OReilly and Main, 2012; Torchia, Calabr¼o, and Huse, 2011). It is di¢ cult
to extrapolate the e¤ect of moving towards more equal gender representation from these
settings where the proportion of female directors in the median rm is zero. In our setting
over 50% of our sample rms have more than one female director, while about 10% of boards
are gender-balanced. This allows us to more adequately address this issue.
The paper examines the performance gains from integrating female directors in the gov-
ernance mechanism, over and above representation. Directors who sit on key committees are
more likely to inuence governance and strategy (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The represen-
tation of female directors on the board, without involvement in key committees, is unlikely
to have a marked impact on governance, and reveals little about the potential e¤ect of female
directors in rm performance. It has been suggested that a critical mass of female directors
is necessary to inuence governance (Torchia et al. 2011; Schwartz-Ziv 2015). For instance,
Schwartz-Ziv (2015) nds that Israeli rms with at least three female directors have better
corporate governance outcomes than rms with a single female director.
We examine the performance impact of female representation on corporate boards in
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two ways. First, we focus on the fraction of female directors on the board. Employing a
sample of large European rms in which the female representation on corporate boards is
more variable than that in US, and UK samples. Second, we examine the e¤ect of female
directors on key governance committees (viz. Audit Committee, Nomination Committee,
and Remuneration Committee). This allows us to examine the impact of female directors on
rm performance when they are in a position to inuence the governance mechanism. The
central nding of this paper is that while female representation on corporate boards has a
modest performance impact, female representation on key corporate governance committees
is more economically meaningful. One standard deviation increase in the proportion of
female directors on committees enhances rm performance by 0.6 of a standard deviation. In
comparison, a one standard deviation increase in female board representation increases rm
performance by 0.18 of a standard deviation. The implications are important and twofold.
First, appointing female directors on the board in response to regulatory pressure has, at
best, a limited e¤ect on rm performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gregory-Smith et al.
2014). Second, the appointment of female directors to governance committees is indicative
of a exible board that includes high ability individuals in the governance mechanism to
enhance rm performance. Finally, we seek to explicitly reconcile our results with other
evidence for UK and US rms.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the
gender composition of corporate boards, Section 3 introduces the sample and the estimation
methods employed for the analysis, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Female representation on corporate boards
The existing evidence on board composition focuses primarily on the equity and the pro-
ductivity impacts of female representation. Arguments in favour of increased representation
of women on corporate boards traditionally stem from concerns about discrimination and
moral justice. A key point of contention is the upward trend in female participation in the
labour force (Black and Juhn, 2000). Whereas, even though females in the top US executive
ranks tripled between 1992-1997, they still represent a very small proportion of the total
female workforce (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). The apparent incongruence of female rep-
resentation on boards and female representation in the labour force could be due to supply
constraints, statistical discrimination, or a combination of both. Disentangling these chan-
nels is empirically di¢ cult, largely because all applications for directorships are not publicly
observed. Powell and Buttereld (1994) argue that discriminatory practices hinder the career
progression of equally qualied women on to corporate boards. Farrell and Hersch (2005),
and Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) examine the appointment of new directors and nd that
the incidence of female appointments is signicantly higher if the immediate predeccessor
was a female. Such evidence of a non-neutral director appointment process ties in with the
notion of tokenism. If the only time female directors are appointed is to replace outgoing
female directors, then, in the absence of regulations, the low fraction of female directors on
corporate boards will persist over time.
Discriminatory gender bias in director appointments is likely to leave rms with a com-
petitive disadvantage. Insofar as these are losses of e¢ ciency due to discrimination in a
competitive setting (Becker, 1957), but may also be the case if diverse teams outperform
homogeneous teams (Kahane, Longley, and Simmons, 2013). Productivity gains from fe-
male representation on corporate boards can be manifest in better attendance of directors
on the board, performance-sensitive CEO pay and CEO turnover, and generally better cor-
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porate governance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). A more gender diverse board may also be
associated with improved decision making, the displacement of less able male directors and
more e¢ cient monitoring (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams, Gupta, Haughton, and
Leeth, 2007).
In addition to the gains in governance outcomes, does female representation on corpo-
rate boards have an impact on rm performance? Empirical evidence suggests that board
composition has no signicant e¤ect on rm performance and even that the e¤ect of board
gender diversity on rm performance can be negative (Larcker, et al. 2007; Adams and
Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Gregory-Smith et al. 2014). Gul, Srinidhi, and
Ng (2011) nd that female representation on boards improve stock price informativeness
through increased public disclosure. However, these results are typically based on either
studies of boards with only one female director or mandatory enforcement of regulations on
female board representation. Thus, these results could capture the e¤ect of tokenism, rather
than the causal impact, of female representation on rm performance.
The majority of studies on female representation on corporate boards uses samples of
US rms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng, 2011; Torchia et al. 2011).
Little empirical evidence exists from European nations [see Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) for
the UK and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) for Norway]. European rms di¤er from US rms
in that a larger proportion are family-controlled in Europe, a lower prevalence of dual-class




The primary database used in the analysis is BoardEx, which provides information on board
composition and director networks for listed European rms. We use a sample of EuroTop
100 rms for the period 2004-2013.1 EuroTop 100 are the largest rms, in terms of market
capitalisation, listed in any of stock exchanges of the European Union. Firms that appear
at least once in the EuroTop 100 are followed until the end of the sample period as long as
they remain listed. The sample rms are drawn from eleven western European countries:
Belgium (5), Denmark (7), France (24), Germany (21), Italy (10), Netherlands (13), Nor-
way (3), Spain (11), Sweden (4), Switzerland (14), and the United Kingdom (40). We use
information on individual directors on the boards of these rms. We drop observations on
individual directors observed in only one period in a given rm. We augment this database
with a range of nancial performance metrics using Datastream. Firms with unavailable -
nancial performance metrics were excluded. The nal sample consists of an unbalanced panel
of 152 rms with 16,647 director-year observations. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
for selected rm, board and individual director characteristics. A steady, albeit incremental,
increase in female representation on European boards is evident over the last decade (see
Figures 1 and 2 for our sample period). Also, the fraction of rms with at least 20% female
representation on the board has increased over the sample period, but female representation
on key governance committees has been relatively stable throughout. We use theses vari-
ations in female representation on boards and the female representation on committees to
investigate the central question regarding rm performance.
[Insert Table 1 and Figs. 1 and 2 near here]
1We choose this sample period because of better coverage and consistency of BoardEx data.
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About 30% of our sample are UK rms. In further extensions we di¤erentiate between
samples of UK-rms, and non-UK European rms, which allows us to compare our ndings
with respect to the evidence from UK rms. In the following subsections, we present details
regarding the relative characteristics of the two samples. On average, UK rms are com-
parable in size to European rms, but with lower protability and lower volatility of stock
prices.2
3.2 Key variables and summary statistics
Females constitute 2,468 or 13.45% of our sample of directors.3 We use three measures
of female representation: Any Female, % Female Directors on Board, and % Female on
Committees. Any Female is a binary indicator of the presence of at least one female board
member in a given rm-year. While only 25% of the sample rms in Adams and Ferreira
(2009) have more than one female director, over 50% of our sample rms have more than one
female director. % Female Directors on Board is the ratio of female directors to total directors
expressed as a percentage. An average board in our sample has 18.68% female representation,
compared with 8.5% in the US sample (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and 5% in the UK sample
(Gregory-Smith et al., 2014). % Female on Committees is the ratio of the combined number
of female directors on three key committees (Audit Committee, Nomination Committee, and
Remuneration Committee) to the total number of directors on these committees, expressed as
a percentage. Committees specialize in narrowly-dened tasks. The number and functions of
these committees vary across rms, and roles are sometimes combined. The Audit Committee
focuses on the appointment of independent auditors and management of internal nancial
performance, the Nomination Committee recommends the appointment of new directors to
2In further analysis, reported in section 5.5., we use a sample of S&P 500 rms in an attempt to reconcile
our results with existing US evidence.
3The comparable gures are 8.87% for the US (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and 8.19% for the UK (Gregory-
Smith, et al, 2014).
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the board, and the Remuneration/Compensation Committee deals with compensation and
benets for executives. A priori, a director who sits on one or more of these committees is
more likely to inuence the governance mechanism through her inuence on the proposals
and decisions of these committees. The proportion of female directors on the three key
committees is an important variable for our empirical strategy as it measures the extent to
which female directors are integrated into the governance mechanism of the rm. A total of
1,136 or 46% of the female directors in our sample are members of at least one of the three
governance committees.4 The proportional representation of female directors on committees
is greater than that on the board. Conditional of being on the board, female directors of
European rms have an even chance of being on at least one committee.
In Table 2, we compare rm-year and board-year characteristics for rms with at least
one female director and rms without a female director. Firms with at least one female
director are on average larger, perform better in terms of return on assets, and have higher
stock price volatility. These ndings suggest that female representation on corporate boards
is associated with rm characteristics, and performance outcomes.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
In Figures 3 and 4, we show the proportion of females on the board and the proportion
of females on committees for the samples of UK and non-UK European rms. Although
both groups have similar female representation on corporate boards (13.33% versus 13.68%),
female representation on committees of UK rms (33%) is signicantly lower than that for
non-UK rms (70%). A larger proportion of UK rms have at least 10% female directors
compared with non-UK rms, but a larger fraction of non-UK rms have more than 20% and
more than 50% female representation on governance committees. This highlights a possible
4 Proportion of women on committees for a sample of U.S. rms is 9.61% (Adams and Ferreira, 2009. In
our data, only 14.19% of female directors are appointed to committees in the UK, and 12.72% in the US.
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di¤erence in the representation and the participation of female directors in the governance
mechanism.5
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 near here]
The comparison of rms with and without female directors (Table 2) suggests that rm
characteristics can inuence female representation on corporate boards. We include a set of
covariates such as rm size, protability, and stock-price volatility to control for di¤erences
in rm characteristics. The association between board gender diversity and performance may
vary with the choice of rm performance measure (Erhardt, et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2006).
The primary measure of rm performance for our analysis is Return on Assets (ROA). To
test for robustness of the results, we use other standard measures of performance: Tobins
q approximated by market-to-book value ratio (MTBV) and Returns on Equity (ROE). We
control for risk in a rms operational environment using the standard deviation of monthly
stock returns over the previous 12-month period. The natural logarithm of annual sales is
used to control for rm size.6 We also control for usual board characteristics: board size and
board independence (percentage of independent directors on the board).7
The controls for director characteristics are the age of the directors, time in the current
role and time on the board. The compensation schedule is similar for all directors. Whether
nominal pay di¤erences can have an impact upon the association between female represen-
tation and rm performance is not clear. Therefore we do not use the pay information in
our empirical models. Summary statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
5Existing studies use either contemporaneous female representation (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) or lagged
measures (Gregory-Smith, et al. 2014). We choose to use lagged measures (one period) but stress that results
are very similar if we use contemporaneous measures. These estimates are available upon request.
6We check for the robustness of the measure of rm size by log(Total Assets).
7In the case of two-tier boards, board size is the linear summation of the number of directors on both
the management and the supervisory board. The denition of independent director varies marginally across
countries. However, the basic remains that for a director to be considered independent, she will not be a
current or a former employee, a relative of a sitting executive, or has business relations with the rm.
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The selection of individual directors to boards, and on committees, as well as the directors
impact on rm performance could be driven by the skills and experience. We use time in the
current role, time on the board and age of the directors as measures of proxies for skill.
4 Empirical methods
Our initial approach is to estimate variants of the following model which aims to provide
evidence on the association between female participation and rm performance:
FirmP erf ormanceit = 1%FemaleDirectorsonBoardit 1 + Z + "it (1)
where 1 captures the strength of association of female board representation and rm
performance, and Z is a vector of all rm and director characteristics. Firm characteristics,
performance, and female board representation can be co-determined. Therefore, all inde-
pendent variables, including the measure of female representation on the board, are lagged
by one period. Our main estimates focus on the proportion of the board that is female, but
in subsequent we also examine the e¤ect of having at least one female on the board.
Next, we investigate a possible route to impact on rm performance of female repre-
sentation. We estimate the likelihood of an individual female directors appointment to
key governance committees (Audit Committee, Nomination Committee, and Remuneration
Committee. We examine how the network of female directors impacts upon their appoint-
ment to these committees, and through these appointments on rm performance. We es-
timate the following linear probability model for the likelihood of female directors being
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appointed to committees8:
CommitteeAppointmentit = Femaleit + Z + it (2)
The dependent variable is a binary indicator of a female director appointment to one or
more of the key committees in a given rm-year.  is the linear probability of an individual
female director being appointed to the committees and Z is a vector of all rm and director
characteristics.
Finally, we test our central hypothesis that the appointment of female directors to key
committees is associated with better rm performance. We investigate the impact of female
representation on committees to rm performance:
FirmP erf ormanceit = 2%FemaleDirectorsonCommitteesit 1 + Z + it (3)
The estimate on 2 reects the impact of female directors on rm performance, condi-
tional on their being appointed on the committees.
A key challenge to causal interpretation is that there may be omitted unobservable char-
acteristics that simultaneously a¤ect rm performance and the appointment of female di-
rectors, to both the board and to committees. We adopt a number of approaches to this
problem. First, we use rm xed e¤ects to control for any time-invariant omitted variables
whereby rms that vary in underlying productivity are more or less likely to appoint women.
Second, we then further adopt an IV approach where we rely upon an instruments previously
used in the literature: the fraction of male directors on the board of rm i who sit on other
boards (rms other than i) with at least one female director (Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
8As a measure of robustness, we also estimate a probit model.
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Gregory-Smith et al. 2014). The argument is that if male directors of the board of rm i
have exposure to other boards with female directors, then they are more likely to appoint
female directors to their own board. However this should not impact upon rm performance,
except through the appointment of female directors on the board.9 Similarly, we attempt
to control for endogeneity in the committee appointments by using the proportion of male
members who sit on other boards with at least one female committee member.
Further, with the rm performance indicators likely to be serially correlated, we include
the lagged dependent variable as a covariate and estimate specications (1) and (3) by
generalised method of moments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). We
use the two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors.
5 Results and analysis
5.1 Female board representation and rm performance
In Table 3, we present estimates of the impact of female board representation on rm per-
formance. In Column 1 we show the e¤ect of the proportion of female directors on boards,
lagged by one period, on rm performance (ROA). We progressively add rm-level and
board-level characteristics in Columns 2 and 3 respectively, and then nally rm and year
xed e¤ects in Column 4. In all the specications, the proportion of female directors on
board is positively associated with rm performance. To quantify the magnitude of these
e¤ects, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of female directors increase ROA
9We test for robustness by using an alternate measure of connectedness: network size. BoardEx reports
the network size of individual directors, which is equal to the number of other directors a given individual
is related to. A relation between two individuals is established if they graduated in the same class, have
worked in the same rm together; sat on the same boards at the same time, or share familial ties.
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by 0.07 units, which is 18% of the standard deviation of ROA.10 This nding supports
the idea that having more female directors on corporate boards can be value-enhancing.
However, this result could be biased by the endogeneity in female representation and rm
performance.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
To address the concern that the positive correlation between female directors and rm
performance could be endogenous, we present in Table 4 the results for female board rep-
resentation and rm performance using a range of approaches. In all the specications,
the dependent variable is ROA. In specications (1) and (2) we present the ordinary least
squares (OLS) and xed e¤ects estimates, respectively. A positive and signicant association
exists between % Female Directors on Board and rm performance. In specication (4), this
association is large but marginally signicant only at the 10% level. The positive association
between rm performance and female board representation appears robust to our attempts
to address issues of endogeneity.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
To further test the robustness of our results we use a di¤erent measure of female rep-
resentation. In Table 5, we present estimates where ROA is the dependent variable. The
measures of female representation used in the two specications are % Female Directors on
Board, and Any Female in a given rm-year. Some interesting insights emerge. Having one
female director on board is negatively associated with performance, and the proportion of
female directors is positively associated with performance. These results hint at the nature
of tokenism in the appointment of female directors on boards.
10The economic impact is arrived at by multiplying the standard deviation of the proportion of female
directors (14.489) with the coe¢ cient on %Female on Boardt 1 from Column 4 of Table 3 (0.005). The
impact on mean performance is calculated using the ratio of the product and mean ROA.
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[Insert Table 5 near here]
We use a range of rm performance measures to test the robustness of the results: ROA,
Tobins q, approximated by market-to-book value ratio, and ROE. The positive association
between rm performance and the proportion of female directors on the board persists with
all measures of performance. To economize space, these results are not presented.
Our results thus suggest that gender diverse corporate boards are associated with better
rm performance, but the association weakens after controlling for rm characteristics. While
some evidence exists of performance gains from female representation on corporate boards,
the magnitude of the e¤ect on rms is modest regarding any policy implications.
5.2 Committee assignments of female directors
A priori, a director who is a member of one or more of the key committees has greater
inuence on strategic choices made by the rm. We test whether the likelihood of female
directors being on these committees is di¤erent from that of male directors, conditional on
the proportion of females on the board. From a revealed preference stand-point, appointment
to committees should reveal the quality of the directors, irrespective of their gender. The
sample is restricted to only non-executive directors and rm-years with at least one of the
three key governance committees. We present the results of linear probability models in
Table 6. The key variable of interest is Female, an indicator for an individual director
being female. The number of observations varies across specications because not all rms
in the sample have all three committees. The dependent variable in each specication is a
binary indicator of an individual director on any of the three committees, and the individual
committees. All specications present linear probability estimates with rm xed e¤ects and
year dummies, and standard errors clustered at the rm level.
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[Insert Table 6 near here]
In Column 1 the dependent variable indicates if an individual director is a member of
at least one of the three committees. In columns 2-4 the dependent variable indicates if
an individual director is a member, respectively, of the Audit Committee, the Nomination
Committee, or the Nomination Committee. Overall, the likelihood of female directors being
appointed to any of the three committees is not statistically di¤erent from that of the male
directors. The estimate on the Female indicator is negative but not signicant at conven-
tional levels. Unsurprisingly, female directors are more likely to be appointed to committees
when the proportion of female directors on the board is high. Of the committees, female
directors are only relatively more likely to be appointed to the Audit Committee. This is con-
sistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009), who nds that female directors are over-represented
in monitoring-related committees. The likelihood of female directors on the Nomination
Committee is negative, but this is not statistically signicant at conventional levels. Intu-
itively, the lower probability of female directors on the Nomination Committee could hint at
a possible reason behind lower female director appointments. However, we cannot provide
any denitive evidence on this.
5.3 Female committee representation and rm performance
We examine the performance hypothesis, i.e.. female directors can inuence rm performance
through governance if she is a member of the key committees. In Table 7, we investigate
the e¤ect of female committee representation on rm performance. However, female com-
mittee representation could be mechanically correlated with the number of female directors
appointed to the board. Therefore we control for the number of female directors on board.
In Columns 1 and 2, we present the OLS, and xed e¤ects estimates of the proportion of
female directors on committees on ROA. The issue of endogeneity in rm performance and
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the appointment of female directors on key committees is a potential concern. To circumvent
this, we use an instrumental variable approach and GMM is Columns 3 and 4, respectively.
The instrument used in Column 3 is the proportion of male directors who sit on other boards
with female directors on key committees. We include the number of female directors on the
board to control for the mechanical association of board and committee membership.
In all the specications, the proportion of female directors on key committees has a pos-
itive e¤ect on rm performance. This e¤ect on rm performance is of an order of magnitude
higher than the e¤ect of the proportion of females on the board. All other covariates retain
their usual sign and signicance.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
Our general nding is that the greater the integration of female directors in the function-
ing of the boards, the greater the performance gains from female representation. To quantify,
a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of females in committees increases ROA
by 0.59 standard deviation. Existing studies estimate only the impact of female representa-
tion (but not participation), which could partially explain their ndings of zero or negative
impact on rm performance of female board representation. The impact of female commit-
tee representation on rm performance is a novel result, highlighting the possible tokenism
on boards in which female directors are not appointed to committees. In the presence of
statistical gender discrimination, female directors are likely to be drawn from the higher
end of the ability distribution of females. That appointing these high-ability individuals to
the decision-making committees is performance enhancing possibly suggests a more general
implication that the quality of the directors matter for rm performance.
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5.4 Additional Results and Robustness
Approximately 30% of our observations are for UK rms. To ascertain whether our results
are driven by the disproportionate presence of rms from one country, we run the baseline
regressions separately for UK and non-UK European rms. The results are presented in Table
9. We provide results for both measures of board gender diversity: % Female on Board, and
% Female on Committees. This exercise provides some interesting insights. First, the e¤ect
on rm performance of the proportion of female directors on the board is stronger for the
non-UK sample and the parameter estimate for the UK sample is statistically insignicant.
This is consistent with the results of Gregory-Smith et al (2014) that evidence on performance
gains from board gender diversity is lacking for UK rms. This, combined with the large
proportion UK rms in our main sample, suggests larger gender e¤ects for non-UK rms.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Second, the e¤ect on rm performance of the proportion of female directors on key
committees is stronger for the non-UK sample, but the parameter estimate for the UK
sample is also both signicant and positive. This reinforces our previous point that the
traditional measures of board gender diversity do not reect the degree of integration of
the female directors in the governance mechanism.11 The full economic benets of female
representation could be internalized by integrating them through committee appointments.
Finally, we compare the results with a sample of Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 rms.
The results presented in Columns 5 and 6 suggest that the proportion of female directors on
boards and committees are negatively associated with rm performance. The smaller propor-
tion of female directors on US boards (8.6%), and committees (12.7%) could be driving these
11The regressions for Table 8 contain the full set of controls as the baseline regressions. In the interests of
brevity, we report the estimates of only the key variables.
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ndings. Although the estimates are signicant for the sample of US rms, the economic
impact of both measures of female representation is weaker than our baseline estimates. One
standard deviation change in the proportion of female directors on board (committees) leads
to a 0.06 (0.11) standard deviation change in ROA.
Our results on the performance impact on rm performance of female representation are
di¤erent from that of the existing evidence. This is possibly due to higher participation of
female directors in the governance mechanism through their presence on the key committees.
The UK and US evidence shows the impact of having (a few) female directors on the board
compared to none, whereas we provide evidence of having a critical mass of female directors,
and appointing them in key committees to inuence governance, and performance.
We test the robustness of our results with alternate measures of rm performance:
Market-to-Book Value (MTBV ), and ROE. The results are presented in Columns 2 and
3 of Table 10. All specications are estimated with rm and director-level covariates, but
we report only the key variables. The estimates on % Female on Board, and % Female on
Committees are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates reported in Column 1.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
In the baseline specication, % Female on Committees is calculated as the proportion
of female directors to the total number of director on committees. We use an alternate
measure: proportion of female in committees, conditional on being on the board. We nd
a stronger association of female committee membership and rm performance. The results
are available upon request.
We also construct other measures of diversity using the nationalities of independent
directors, irrespective of their gender. We nd similar performance-gains for appointing
directors of other nationalities on the board, and committees.
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To ensure that our results are not a¤ected by indiosyncratic shocks from the nancial
crisis, we re-estimated our main models excluding observations from 2008 and 2009. The
results with the reduced sample are qualitatively similar to those of the baseline estimates,
but they are less precise. For the sake of parsimony, the tables are not presented here but
are available upon request.
The sample of rms is drawn from eleven countries. It is conceivable that country-
level characteristics, such as female participation in the labour force, culture, and family-
friendly provisions, etc. could be predictors of both female representation on boards and
rm performance. We estimate our baseline regressions with country xed e¤ects instead of
rm xed e¤ects as a measure of robustness. The results are quantitatively similar to the
baseline estimates. The results are omitted in the interests of brevity.
6 Conclusion
Although female representation on corporate boards is likely to remain a central theme of
future governance reforms, there is no clear agreement on the likely economic benets of such
reforms. We provide evidence on a possible mechanism of impact on performance of board
gender diversity. The results of this paper suggest that female representation on corporate
boards is associated with enhanced rm performance, particularly when the female directors
are appointed to key decision making committees.
More generally, no clear evidence emerges on how boards react to institutional pres-
sures on board composition and whether board composition impacts upon rm performance.
Boards can chose a compliance strategy of token female representation, or they can chose to
be exible in realising the benets of appointing high ability individuals to decision-making
committees. Appointment of female directors (and directors of other nationalities) to key
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committees, not under institutional pressure, is an example of board exibility. Our ndings
show that strategically exible boards add value by appointing directors to decision-making
committees, and that the composition of such committees a¤ects rm performance.
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The sample is an unbalanced panel of 18499 director-level observations from 118 rms
for the period 2006-2013. Director level data are obtained from ExecuComp and rm
level data are from Datastream. All variables are winsorized at the1%-level. Tobins q
is approximated by the market-to-book value ratio (MTBV )
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Firm Characteristics
Return on Assets 16,647 6.643 6.108 -09.28 38.95
Log Sales 16,647 17.558 0.921 14.39 20.02
Tobins-Q 16,647 2.866 5.792 -58.37 86.00
Stock Price Volatility 16,647 0.939 0.913 0.05 9.44
Board Characteristics
Board Size 16,647 16.963 5.942 6.00 36.00
%Independent Directors 16,647 47.743 27.786 0.00 91.00
Firm has Female Directors (%) 16,647 91.087 28.493 0.00 100.00
Firm has One Female Director 16,647 17.49 37.99 0.00 100.00
% Female in Board 16,647 18.531 14.489 0.00 88.89
% Female in Committees 16,647 15.200 16.175 0.00 60.21
Nomination Committee Size 16,647 3.941 2.473 0.00 16.00
Audit Committee Size 16,647 4.208 1.461 0.00 8.00
Remuneration Committee Size 16,647 3.432 1.949 0.00 9.00
% Non-native Directors 16,647 12.614 18.330 0.00 48.25
% Non-native Directors 16,647 10.212 15.093 0.00 27.78
in Committees
Director Characteristics
Time on Board 16,647 5.756 5.269 0.00 54.90
Time in Role 16,647 4.535 4.238 0.00 47.72
Executive Age (years) 16,647 58.115 8.097 26.00 90.00
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Table 2
Comparisons of rms with and without at least one female director
This table presents key summary statistics for rm-years with no female directors and
rm-years with at least one female director. Firms with no female directors are
smaller and have smaller boards. No statistically signicant di¤erence in any other
attributes. All variables are winsorized at the 1%-level. Tobins q is approximated by
the market-to-book value ratio (MTBV )
Variable No Female At Least One p-value
Directors mean Female Director-Mean
Log Sales 17.296 17.614 0.000
Tobins-Q 3.025 2.819 0.272
Return on Assets 5.869 6.697 0.000
Board Size 15.140 17.152 0.072
% Independent Directors 47.109 47.811 0.011
Executive Age 59.035 58.013 0.000
Nomination Committee Size 3.849 3.950 0.066
Audit Committee Size 3.283 4.308 0.000
Remuneration Committee Size 3.541 3.420 0.010
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Figure 1: Yearly Trends in Board Gender Diversity
This gure shows the rise in female representation on corporate
boards. There seems to be an increase in the proportion
of rms with more than 20% female directors.
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Figure 2: Yearly Trends in Female Representation
on Governance Committees
The fraction of female directors on key governance committees has
remained relatively stable over our sample period.
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Figure 3: Female Representation on Boards:
UK vs Non-UK Firms
This gure compares the female representation on boards of UK and
non-UK European rms in our sample. A higher fraction of non-UK
rms have 10% female directors, whereas a higher fraction
of UK rms have over 50% female directors on board.
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Figure 4: Female Representation on Governance
Committees: UK vs Non-UK Firms
This gure compares the female representation on key governance
committees of UK and non-UK European rms in our sample. A higher




Female representation on board and rm performance
This table presents the results of the impact on rm performance of
female representation on boards: %Female in board. The dependent
variable in all the columns is Return on Assets (ROA). In Column 1 we
present the unconditional e¤ect. In Columns 2 and 3 we add rm and
board characteristics, and in Column 4 we add rm and year xed
e¤ects. In all specications, there is a positive association of female
board representation on rm performance, but the e¤ect weakens with
addition of rm and board characteristics. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate signicance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**)
and 0.10 (*) levels.
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
% Female in Board t 1 0.052*** 0.0428*** 0.0148*** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Log Salest 1 0.7290*** 0.3373*** 0.033***
(0.0510) (0.049) (0.007)
Stock Price -0.2642*** -0.2158*** 0.000
Volatilityt 1 (0.0076) (0.007) (0.026)
Board Sizet 1 -0.4778*** -0.016***
(0.0102) (0.003)




Constant 5.008*** 24.99*** 28.69*** 4.70***
(0.804) (0.920) (0.884) (0.593)
Firm xed e¤ects No No No Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes
Observations 16.647 16,647 16,647 16,647
Adjusted R2 4.15 10.58 19.76 20.80
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Table 4
Female directors and rm Performance-Di¤erent Estimation Techniques
The results of the e¤ect of female directors on rm performance are presented
using di¤erent estimation techniques. The main variables of interest is
%Female in Board. Column (1) presents the OLS estimates. Column (2)
includes rm xed e¤ects. Column (3) presents Instrumental Variable (IV)
estimates with proportion of male directors with outside directorships in rms
with female directors as an instrument. Column (4) presents the results from
Arellano-Bond one step regression (GMM ). All specications include year
dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
Dependent variable: Return on Assets
OLS FE IV GMM
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
% Female in Board t 1 0.023** 0.005** 0.364*** 10.98***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.057) (0.044)
Log Salest 1 -0.300*** 0.033*** 0.580*** 0.737**
(0.049) (0.007) (0.163) (0.306)
Stock Price -0.206*** 0.000 -0.103** -0.918**
Volatilityt 1 (0.007) (0.026) (0.038) (0.483)
Board Sizet 1 -0.472*** -0.016*** -0.0301* -0.244**
(0.010) (0.003) (0.015) (0.095)
% Non Executive -0.064** 0.0757*** 0.237** 0.100
Directorst 1 (0.002) (0.015) (0.079) (0.141)
Constant 26.98*** 28.03*** 31.98** 46.77**
(0.898) (0.927) (4.166) (27.42)
Firm xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,647 16,647 16,647 10,241
No AR(2) 0.329
Sargan Test 0.218
Adjusted R2 25.50 20.80 26.21
34
Table 5
Traditional Measures of Female Representation
This table presents the results of the impact on rm
performance of female representation on boards using
two di¤erent measures of female representation, viz.
%Female in board (1), Any Female: whether there is at
least one female director in a rm-year (2). The impact of
a token representation of female directors on ROA is neg
-ative but the association of proportion of female directors
on board and rm performance is positive. All specications
include year dummies. Robust standard errors in parenthes
-es. Asterisks indicate signicance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**)





% Female in Board t 1 0.005***
(0.002)
Log Salest 1 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock Price 0.000 -0.029
Volatilityt 1 (0.026) (0.026)
Board Sizet 1 -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003)




Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 16,647 16,647
Adjusted R2 20.80 29.28
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Table 6
Assignment of Women Directors on Key Committees
This table presents the probability of individual female directors to be assigned to key
governance committees-audit, nomination and remuneration. The main variables of
interest are Female and Female*%Female. Female is a binary indicator for a
female director. The results suggest that female directors are more likely to be
chosen on any committees when the % of Female directors on the board is high. All
estimates are from linear probability models with rm xed e¤ects and year dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate signicance at 0.01 (***),
0.05(**) and 0.10 (*) levels.
Dependent Variable
Any Audit Nomination Remuneration
Committee Committee Committee Committee
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.098*** 0.096*** -0.019** 0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Time in Role -0.0011 -0.001 -.000 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age (Years) 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.0004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Size -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female in Board 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Non Executive 0.000 -0.0007*** 0.000 0.004**
Directors (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROAit 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Sales -0.024** -0.013** -0.029*** -0.021**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Stock Price 0.002*** 0.000 0.001** -0.000
Volatility (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Network Size 5.86e-04*** 9.01e-06** 4.24e-05*** 2.85e-06***
(5.10e-06) (4.29e-06) (4.26e-06) (4.28e-06)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 1,136 665 471 427
female directors
Observations 16,647 15,246 14,937 15,132
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Table 7
Female Representation on Committees and Firm Performance
This table presents the results of GMM estimation of the impact
of female representation on committees on rm performance. The
Dependent variable in each specication is ROA. Standard error
is reported in the bracket. Asterisks indicates signicance at the
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) levels.
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
OLS FE IV GMM
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
% Female in 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.613*** 2.23***
Committeest 1 (0.006) (0.002) (0.277) (0.582)
yt 1 0.889***
(0.334)
Log Salest 1 0.419*** 0.431** 0.455*** 0.787*
(0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.391)
Stock Price -0.216*** -0.205 -0.219*** -0.424
Volatilityt 1 (0.065) (0.169) (0.101) (0.327)
No. of Female Direct 0.183*** 0.024* 0.011* 0.086
-ors on the Board (0.025) (0.014) (0.006) (0.045)
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.483)
Board Sizet 1 -0.479*** -0.408** -0.410*** -0.644**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.315)
% Non Executive 0.064*** 0.062** 0.062** 0.127
Directorst 1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.130)
Constant 30.052*** 29.18*** 28.69*** 38.65**
(0.894) (0.999) (1.02) (15.08)
Firm xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2(%) 20.12 21.19 21.38





Comparison of UK, Non-UK and US Samples
This table presents the results of the impact on rm performance of female repres
-entation on boards for the UK and the non-UK sub-samples. Two measures of female
representations are used: viz. %Female directors on the board (1) and (3), and % of
Female directors on committees (2) &(4). The dependent variable in all
specications is ROA. The results suggest a stronger impact of female representation
on rm performance for the non-UK sample. All specications include year dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate signicance at 0.01 (***),
0.05(**) and 0.10 (*) levels.
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
UK Non-UK Europe US
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Female in 0.007 0.033*** -0.002**
Board t 1 (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
% Female in 0.011* 0.037*** -0.001***
Committeet 1 (0.006) (0.003) (0.000)
Constant 26.18*** 26.095*** 30.07*** 29.414*** 25.44*** 24.76***
(1.609) (1.621) (1.233) (1.262) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,794 5,794 10,580 10,580 28,843 28,843
Adjusted R2 28.29 28.29 22.22 22.02 26.04 18.53
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Table 9
Alternative Measures of Firm Performance
This table presents the results of the impact on rm performance of female
representation on boards using three di¤erent measures of rm performan-
ce, viz. ROA, MTBV, and ROE. We report estimates for %Female on Board
and %Female on Committees. All specications include standard set of




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6))
% Female in 0.005*** 0.005** 0.054**
Board t 1 (0.002) (0.028) (0.023)
% Female in 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.182***
Committeet 1 (0.002) (0.003) (0.024)
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,647 16,647 16,647 16,647 16,647 16,647
Adjusted R2 20.80 21.19 18.65 20.00 26.32 29.28
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Appendix
Variable summary and data description
In this table we describe the key variables and their sources. The variables are arranged under
three broad categories: Firm Characteristics, Board Characteristics, and Director Characteristics.
Key Variables Source Description
Firm Characteristics
Return on Assets Datastream/Worldscope. Net Income/Total Assets
Sales Datastream/Worldscope. Annual sales (000 US$)
Tobins-Q Datastream/Worldscope. Market-to-Book value
Stock Price Volatility Datastream/Worldscope. Volatility in annual stock price
Board Characteristics
Board Size BoardEx/RiskMetrics No. of directors on board(s)
%Independent BoardEx/RiskMetrics Fraction of independent directors
% Female in Board BoardEx/RiskMetrics Fraction of female directors on board
% Female in Committees BoardEx/RiskMetrics Fraction of female directors on committees
Nomination Committee Size BoardEx/RiskMetrics Directors on the nomination committee
Audit Committee Size BoardEx/RiskMetrics Directors on the audit committee
Remuneration Committee Size BoardEx/RiskMetrics Directors on the remuneration committee
% Non-native Directors BoardEx/RiskMetrics Board members who are of nationalities
other than where the rm is listed
% Non-native Directors BoardEx/RiskMetrics Committee members who are of nationa-
in Committees -lities other than where the rm is listed.
Director Characteristics
Female BoardEx/RiskMetrics Gender of the individual director
Time on Board BoardEx/RiskMetrics No. of years as a director on the board
Time in Role BoardEx/RiskMetrics No. of years in the current role
Executive Age BoardEx/RiskMetrics Age in years
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